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IN I'll!' HI All I 1)1 IK I Dl ^PI't'ALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff? Appellee, 
v. 
TOMMY LEE ANGELOS, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010509-CA 
BRIEF OF £E 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a sentence entered pursuant to a plea in abeyance to two 
inscription under false pretenses, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(3)(a)(ii) (Supp. 2002 :, 
Davis County, Utah, the Honorable Jon M. Memmott presiding. This Court has 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. •*" "/here defendant was properly re-sentenced with counsel present, is 
Ins i j j i m ll d plamr sentencing him without counsel moot? 
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies. 
1 
Issue No. 2: Did the trial court plainly err where defendant was given adequate 
notice of the trial court's intention to terminate his plea agreement, and where defendant 
fails to show that he was harmed by any lack of notice? 
Standard of Review: Defendant's claim is reviewed for plain error. See State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statute is reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On four separate occasions during October 1999, defendant used false names and 
addresses to obtain prescription Loratab from.the Centerville Albertson's pharmacy. R. 
1-3; 12:7.1 When questioned about Ac validity of the prescriptions, the doctors named on 
the prescriptions informed the pharmacy that they had not prescribed that medication to 
defendant. R. 1-3. 
Defendant was charged by information with four counts of obtaining a prescription 
under false pretenses, each third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
jCitation to the unnumbered transcript dated January 21,2000 to May 24, 2001 
which contains 38 different tabs marking individual proceedings including the sentencing 
hearing dated May 15, 2001, will be made by specifying the numbered tab followed by a 
colon and then the specific page of that document (i.e. tab number twelve, page one of the 
transcript would be cited as 12:1). 
2 
8(3)(a)(ii) (1998). R. 1-3. Defendant retained William Albright as counsel. R.2:l. 
During preliminary proceedings, the trial court recommended defendant for admittance 
into the Davis County Drug Court program. R. 2:1-2; 3:1-4; 4:1; 5:1-2; 6:1-2. On May 9, 
2000, defendant entered a guilty plea to two counts of obtaining a prescription under false 
pretenses, to be held in abeyance for 36 months pending his completion of the drug court 
program. R. 48-55; 12:1-11. In exchange for defendant's plea in abeyance, the two 
remaining charges were dismissed. R. 48-53; 12:3. 
Several weeks latter, on June 20,2000, defendant was picked up for using alcohol 
in violation of the terms of his agreement. R. 48-53; 17:1-6. Defendant was then 
admitted into both the Addiction Treatment Unit (ATU) and Addiction Recovery Center 
(ARC) programs. R. 18:1-3. Three months later, after completing those programs, 
defendant again violated the terms of his agreement when he was picked up while driving 
with a blood alcohol level of .297. R. 48-53; 27:1-3. Defendant confessed to the 
violation. R. 27:1-3; 28:1-2. In response, the court committed defendant to the county 
jail for six months and required that he complete Residential Substance Abuse Treatment 
(RSAT), a five-month program offered through the jail. R. 80-81, 85; 28:1-2. Upon 
completion of his jail term, on March 27, 2001 defendant was accepted back into the drug 
court program and admitted to the University of Utah aftercare treatment program. R. 87-
88, 97-98; 29:1; 30:1, 33:1-2. 
On April 24, 2001, when defendant failed to attend his weekly review hearing and 
drug test, the court issued an arrest warrant. R. 104-05, 107; 37:2. Defendant was 
•3 
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brought before the court on May 8, 2001. R. 155. During that hearing, the court charged 
defendant with violating the terms of his plea agreement for drinking alcohol, stealing 
mini bottles of alcohol from his work, getting fired from his job, living away from home, 
failing to appear for treatment, and failing to appear for drug testing. R. 155:1. 
A 
Defendant admitted to the violations and stated, "I don't want to go through any more 
programs.'* R. 155:1-2. The court then ordered AP&P to complete a recommendation 
and set the case for sentencing. R. 155:2-3. < 
On May 15,2001, defendant appeared before the trial court for sentencing without 
counsel. R. 108-09; 38:1. The court revoked defendant's plea in abeyance and sentenced 
defendant to prison for the statutory term of zero to five years, R. 38:3-4. However, 
consistent with AP&P's recommendation, that sentence was stayed and defendant was 
ordered to serve one year in jail with no credit for time served and 36 months probation. 
R. 38:4. At that point, defendant stated that he did not have an attorney, and he requested 
that one be appointed to him for purposes of an appeal. R. 38:4-5. In response, the court 
offered to let defendant talk to his present appellate coimsel. R. 38:5-6. Defendant timely 
appealed the trial court's sentencing order dated May 15,2001. R. 127. 
Six months later, on November 13,2001, with his attorney present, defendant's 
remaining jail term was suspended and he was re-sentenced to probation. R. 130-31. 
4 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
POINT I: Defendant was sentenced on May 15,2001 without counsel. On appeal, 
defendant claims that the trial court's action violated his state and federal constitutional 
right to counsel at sentencing, and thus constitutes plain error. Defendant asks this court 
to vacate his sentence and remand the case for re-sentencing. However, defendant fails to 
acknowledge that he was re-sentenced with counsel present on November 13,2001. 
Where defendant pled guilty to the charges, no collateral legal consequences result from 
the re-sentencing. Therefore, because defendant received the remedy he now seeks on 
appeal, his claim is moot and need not be considered by this Court. 
POINT II: Defendant also argues that the trial court plainly erred by not giving 
him notice or opportunity to prepare for the May 8,2001 evidentiary hearing regarding 
his violation of the terms of his plea agreement. Thus, defendant claims that his due 
process rights were violated. The record, however, reveals that defendant had adequate 
notice of the trial court's intention to terminate defendant's plea in abeyance and ample 
opportunity to prepare for the evidentiary hearing. Because defendant cannot show that 
the trial court erred, his plain error argument fails. 
To prove plain error, defendant must also show that he suffered prejudice as a 
result of the trial court's alleged error. Even if the notice were viewed as inadequate, 
defendant still fails to show that he was harmed by the trial court's alleged inaction. The 
record indicates that defendant freely admitted to violating the terms of his plea 
agreement at the May 8 hearing. Accordingly, where defendant had no intention of 
• .' 5 \ . • 
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disputing the trial court's allegations, the result of the hearing would have been the same. 
Therefore, defendant's plain error claim also fails on prejudice prong. * 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
' . . • l 
WHERE DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY RE-
SENTENCED WITH COUNSEL PRESENT, fflS CLAIM 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN 
SENTENCING HIM WITHOUT COUNSEL IS MOOT 
• . ' • • • ' ' - • . . : ' • i 
Contending that he has a federal and state constitutional right to be represented by 
counsel at sentencing, defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred at the May 15, 
2001 hearing by sentencing him to probation and one year in jail without counsel. Br. of 1 
Aplt. at 13-19. Defendant asks this Court to vacate his sentence and to remand for a new 
sentencing hearing with counsel present See Br. of Aplt. at 23. 
The State agrees with defendant that sentencing is "a critical stage in a criminal 
proceeding," at which a defendant has both a federal and state constitutional right to the 
assistance of counsel. State v. Martinez, 925 P.2d 176,178 (Utah App. 1996), cert, 
denied, 934 P.2d 652 (Utah 1997); accord Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967); 
State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005,1007 (Utah 1982). The State also does not dispute that 
defendant was unrepresented at the May 15,2001 hearing. Nevertheless, defendant's 
appeal is moot because he received the relief he now seeks on appeal at the November 13, 
2001 hearing. 
6 
"An issue on appeal is considered moot when 'the requested judicial relief cannot 
affect the rights of the litigants.'" State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) (citation 
omitted). Additionally, "'a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no 
possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the 
challenged conviction.'" Martinez, 925 P.2d at 177 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 
40, 57 (1968)) (brackets omitted). 
Granting defendant a remand in this case will not place him in a better position. In 
State v. DeBoard, as in the instant case, the defendant complained that he was sentenced 
without counsel and requested that his sentence be vacated and the case be remanded for 
re-sentencing. State v. DeBoard, No 981387-CA (Utah App. April 1,1999) (unpublished 
memorandum decision).2 Upon examining the record, this Court held that because 
DeBoard was re-sentenced with counsel over a month later, he could not be placed in a 
better position than he was already in. See id. Given that DeBoard had no remedy on 
appeal, the court ruled that his issue was moot. See id. This case is strikingly similar to 
DeBoard. Here, defense counsel was not present when the trial court sentenced 
defendant, yet six months later, the trial court re-sentenced defendant at the November 13, 
2001 hearing in which defense counsel was present. See R. 130-31. Thus, like DeBoard, 
defendant already received the remedy he now seeks on appeal. Accordingly, because 
2DeBoard is cited pursuant to Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, f 16, 444 
P.3d 734, which allows citation to memorandum decisions. A copy of DeBoard is 
attached as Addendum B. 
7 
I 
defendant's requested judicial relief cannot affect his rights his issue is moot. See Sims, 
881P.2dat841. 
Moreover, defendant does not complain that he received inadequate representation 
during the November 13 hearing. Although defendant failed to include a transcript of that 
hearing in the record, presumably both defendant and his attorney were able to present 
any mitigating evidence and argue for a more lenient sentence. See State v. Penman, 964 
P.2d 1157,1162 (Utah App. 1998) (When faced with an '"an [inadequate record on , 
appeal, [an appellate court] must assume the regularity of the proceedings below."') 
(citing State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)). See also State v. 
Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah App. 1995) (assuming the regularity of the 
proceedings below where the appellant failed to include a transcript in the record on 
appeal), cert, denied, 913 P.2d 749 (Utah 1996). 
Additionally, '"there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be 
imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.'" Martinez, 925 P.2d at 177 (citation 
omitted). '"Collateral legal consequences' from a conviction [have] been defined to 
include 'the use of the conviction to impeach the petitioner's character or as a factor in 
determining a sentence in a future trial, as well as petitioner's inability to vote, engage in 
certain businesses; or serve on a jury.'" Id. at 177 n. 1 (citing Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 
43,45 (Utah 1981)). None of those consequences apply here. Because "defendant 
pleaded guilty to the crime and on appeal challenges only the procedures employed in 
imposing [his] sentence^] [defendant's resulting sentence does not invoke the possible 
8 
collateral legal consequences." See id. at 177. Furthermore, where defendant's original 
one year jail sentence was replaced with a new sentence after a hearing with counsel, 
defendant cannot show any adverse collateral legal consequences from not having 
counsel at the May 15 hearing. 
Significantly, defendant has not alleged on appeal that the trial court abused its 
discretion in imposing the final sentence of six months of suspended jail time and three 
years probation or that his sentence was otherwise unfair. Indeed, defendant appealed 
only from the original commitment order and not from the second sentence ordering only 
probation. Defendant also does not explain what better result he could achieve on 
remand. Thus, if this Court were to vacate defendant's sentence and remand for a new 
sentencing hearing, it would only be requiring the trial court to repeat the November 13 
hearing. See Martinez, 925 P.2dat 177. 
In short, defendant simply has not shown how his requested relief would affect his 
position or that the May 15 hearing resulted in ay adverse collateral legal consequences to 
him. Defendant's appeal, therefore, is moot.3 
3
"Utah courts occasionally invoke an exception to mootness for an issue that, 
'although technically moot as to a particular litigant at the time of appeal, is of wide 
concern, affects the public interest, is likely to recur in a similar manner, and because of 
the brief time any one person is affected, would otherwise likely escape judicial review.'" 
Id. at 177-78 (citing Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981)). However, that 
exception does not apply here. The underlying issue in this case—whether a defendant 
has a constitutional right to counsel during sentencing—has been fully resolved. See id. 
at 178 ("[I]t is well settled that sentencing is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding and 
that defendants have a right to counsel during sentencing.") (citing Rhay, 389 U.S. at 137; 
Casarez, 656 P.2d at 1007). 
9 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT GAVE DEFENDANT ADEQUATE 
NOTICE OF ITS INTENTION TO TERMINATE HIS • 
PLEA AGREEMENT; NOTWITHSTANDING THAT, 
DEFENDANT CANNOT SHOW THAT HE WAS 
HARMED BY ANY LACK OF NOTICE WHERE HE 
FREELY ADMITTED TO VIOLATING THE TERMS \ 
OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
Defendant next claims that the trial court violated his due process rights. Br. of 
Aplt. at 20-23. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court plainly erred by not
 { 
providing him with adequate notice and opportunity to prepare for the evidentiary hearing 
concerning termination of his plea in abeyance agreement Br. of Aplt at 21-23.4 In 
making that argument, defendant suggests that the trial court amalgamated the evidentiary 
hearing with the May 15 sentencing hearing, and that he did not receive a separate 
evidentiary hearing in accordance with his plea agreement. Br. of Aplt at 21-23, n. 9. 
Defendant ignores, however, the evidentiary hearing held on May 8,2001, in which he 
admitted to violating the terms of his plea agreement and told the court that "[he did not] 
don't want to go through any more [drug] programs." See R. 155:1-2. Notwithstanding 
that omission, defendant fails to show that the trial court plainly erred. 
4On appeal, defendant erroneously labels himself as a "probationer/* citing both 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(12) (Supp. 2002) and State v. Martin, 1999 UT App 62, f 12, 
976 P.2d 1224, which detail a standard probationer's due process rights. See Br. of Aplt. 
at 20-23. Recently, in State v. Turnbow, 2001 UT App 59,114,21 P.3d 249, this Court 
expressly held that "a plea in abeyance differs from probation in both its statutory 
provisions and function[,]" and that "cases decided under the probation statutes are not 
directly applicable to pleas in abeyance." Therefore, where the termination of 
defendant's plea in abeyance is at issue here, both section 78-18-1(12) and Martin are 
inapplicable to this case. 
10 
To establish plain error, defendant must demonstrate that "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful." State 
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). "If any one of these requirements is not met, 
plain error is not established/' Id. at 1209. 
A. Defendant fails to show that the trial court erred where he received 
adequate notice of the trial court's intention to terminate his plea 
agreement 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l), indicates that a defendant who has entered into a 
plea in abeyance agreement has the right to notice of the trial court's intention to 
terminate his plea agreement. Specifically, section 77-2a-4 states that in the event the 
trial court becomes aware of a defendant's violation of the terms of his plea in abeyance 
agreement, the court "may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear before the 
court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court should not find the 
terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not be 
terminated." Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l) (1999). Once an evidentiary hearing is held 
and it is determined that the defendant failed to comply with the terms of the plea in 
abeyance agreement, the court may terminate the agreement and impose sentence. Id. 
The record in this case indicates that the trial court complied with section 77-2a-
4(1) by providing defendant with timely and adequate notice of the May 8 evidentiary 
hearing . See In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996) ("At a minimum, 4[t]imely and 
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are at the very heart 
of procedural fairness.'") (Citation omitted)). On April 24, 2001, fifteen days prior to 
' M 
i 
May 8 hearing, the trial court became aware of defendant's second violation of the terms 
of his plea agreement. See R. 104-05; 37:2. At that time, the court noted defendant's 
absence from the hearing, his continued absence from his parent's home at night, and the 
fact that he missed a required urinalysis test on April 22,2001. See id. The court issued a 
i 
warrant for defendant's arrest and ordered Detective Dave Bremmer to locate defendant 
and bring him before the court. See id. Defendant next appeared before the court on May 
8. See R. 155. Accordingly, the record suggests that at some point during those fifteen \ 
days, defendant was notified of the court's intention to terminate his plea agreement. See 
id. . ..-
Although the trial court did not issue an order to show cause, the permissive 
language of section 77-2a-4(l) indicating that "[the trial court] may issue an order 
requiring the defendant to appear before the court at a designated time and place to show 
cause" endorses the court's actions. Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l) (1999) (emphasis 
added). Where defendant had left home and his whereabouts were unknown to the court, 
the court's only option to notify defendant was through an arrest warrant. See R. 37:2; 
Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902,911 (Utah 1993) ("'Due process is 
flexible and calls for the procedural protections that the given situation demands.'") 
(Citation omitted). Accordingly, the court's act of issuing an arrest warrant for 
defendant's violation of his plea agreement constituted adequate notice under section 77-
2a-4(l). 
12 
Where defendant received adequate notice of the trial court's intention to terminate 
his plea agreement, he cannot show the existence of any error. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1208. Thus, because defendant fails to prove the first prong of the plain error standard, 
his claim fails. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 31, 12 P.3d 92 (where a defendant 
cannot meet the first prong of the plain error test, a court need not consider the remaining 
prongs). 
B, Where defendant admitted to violating the terms of his plea agreement 
at the May 8 evidentiary hearing, defendant cannot show that he was 
harmed by any lack of notice. 
For defendant to succeed in his plain error claim, he must also show that any error 
was harmful. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09. Even if this Court were to find that 
defendant received inadequate notice, because he admitted to violating the terms of his 
plea agreement, defendant cannot show that he was harmed by the trial court's alleged 
inaction. The dialogue at the beginning of the May 8 evidentiary hearing reveals 
defendant's admission. 
THE COURT: Tommy Angelos. Well, I can't believe all the things 
you have done in the last few weeks. To be honest I'm 
really extremely disappointed. I mean the record 
shows that you were chinking. You were fired from 
your job. They indicated, they reported to me that 
when they went to the room you were in they had 
mini-bottles that were stolen, that they believe were 
stolen from work that were in your room, [sic] You 
were required to live at home; you left home. You 
failed to appear for court. You failed to appear for 
treatment. You failed to appear for drug testing. 
You've had, it looks like you've just quit doing 
everything for about three weeks. 
13 
DEFENDANT: Actually about a week and a half. I relapsed and for 
about five days I went on a binge. I went up to the 
LDS Hospital to check in Day Spring. They had no 
beds there. From there they took me down to Highland 
Ridge, found me a bed. I called Kevin Howard the 
following morning. He told me to stay there and he 
would try to get a hold of you and we would try to set 
up a meeting with you. 
THE COURT: Well, we're probably a little beyond meetings. I mean 
you have been to a number of treatment programs and, 
you know, you had a sponsor to help you. You had 
your parents to help you. You had the treatment 
people. You had a lot of people and, to be honest, you 
turned your back on all of them, just walked away 
from it. It wasn'tjust one person, you had a whole 
bunch of people helping you and you decided on your 
own to just turn your back and you knew that your 
parents were concerned. Your parents told you 
otherwise, that you were getting into problems. Your 
sponsor told you [that] you were going to get into 
problems doing the things you're doing and you did it 
anyway. This isn't a situation where you just sort of 
fell off the wagon and just relapsed. I mean that's a 
real convenient way, you know, and one of your big 
difficulties is that sometimes you just—you've been 
through a program. You've been through RSEP. I 
mean— 
DEFENDANT: 
THE COURT: 
I don't want to go through any more programs. 
Well, no, and you probably won't. You'll probably 
just sit in jail or prison. 
DEFENDANT: Me and my parents have really never ever discussed 
my disease. They think that when I leave jail I'm 
cured and that's what they believe. 
14 
THE COURT: Well, do you admit to those violations that I talked 
about? 
DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
R. 155:1-2. 
Consistent with his admission, on appeal defendant does not deny that he violated 
his plea agreement. See Br. of Aplt. at 21-23. Instead, he claims that he was not given 
"notice and opportunity to prepare for [an evidentiary] hearing[.]" Id. at 21. However, 
defendant's statement that "[he did not] want to go through any more programsf,]" is a 
clear indication that defendant had no intention of refuting the trial court's allegations. 
See R. 155:1-2. Indeed, defendant freely admitted violating his plea agreement. See id. 
Therefore, even if defendant had received proper notice, the result of the evidentiary 
hearing would not have changed. Accordingly, defendant cannot show that he was 
harmed by any lack of notice or opportunity to prepare for the May 8 hearing. Thus, 
defendant's claim that the trial court plainly erred fails. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1209. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
decision of the trial court. 
^J? 
Dated this CZ^day of December, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
COLEMERE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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SCOTT L. WIGGINS 
Arnold & Wiggins 
American Plaza II, Suite 105 
57 West 200 South 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
77-2a-4. Violation of plea in abeyance agreement — Hear-
ing — Entry of judgment and imposition of sen-
tence — Subsequent prosecutions* 
(1) If, at any time during the term of the plea in abeyance agreement, 
information comes to the attention of the prosecuting attorney or the court that 
the defendant has violated any condition of the agreement, the court, at the 
request of the prosecuting attorney, made by appropriate motion and affidavit, 
or upon its own motion, may issue an order requiring the defendant to appear 
before the court at a designated time and place to show cause why the court 
should not find the terms of the agreement to have been violated and why the 
agreement should not be terminated. If, following an evidentiary hearing, the 
court finds that the defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term 
or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the agree-
ment and enter judgment of conviction and impose sentence against the 
defendant for the offense to which the original plea was entered. Upon entry of 
judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence, any amounts paid by the 
defendant as a plea in abeyance fee prior to termination of the agreement shall 
be credited against any fine imposed by the court. 
(2) The termination of a plea in abeyance agreement and subsequent entry 
of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence shall not bar any 
independent prosecution arising from any offense that constituted a violation 
of any term or condition of an agreement whereby the original plea was placed 
in abeyance. 
ADDENDUM B 
Not Reported in P.2d 
1999UTApp 101 
(Cite as: 1999 WL 33244685 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Kelly Ray DeBOARD, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 981387-CA. 
April 1, 1999. 
Catherine L. Begic and Deborah Kreeck Mendez, 
Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Jan Graham and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City, 
for appellee. 
Before WILKINS, DAVIS, and ORME, JJ. 
Page 1 
in a similar manner, and, because of the brief time 
any one person is affected, would otherwise likely 
escape judicial review." Wickham v. Fisher, 629 
P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981). However, the exception 
does not apply. The underlying issue of the 
case-"that sentencing is a critical stage in a 
criminal proceeding and that defendants have a 
right to counsel during sentencing"--is already 
well settled. State v. Martinez, 925 P.2d at 178 
(citations omitted). 
Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed. 
1999 WL 33244685 (Utah App.), 1999 UT App 101 
END OF DOCUMENT 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 DeBoard did not have counsel at the May 13, 
1998, hearing, and requests this court to vacate his 
sentence and remand for re-sentencing. However, 
because DeBoard was represented by counsel at a 
hearing on June 19, 1998, during which he was 
formally sentenced, his claim raises a question of 
mootness. See generally State v. Martinez, 925 P.2d 
176 (Utah Ct.App. 1996). 
An issue on appeal is considered moot when "the 
requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of 
the litigants." State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840, 841 
(Utah 1994) (citations omitted). Even if we accept 
DeBoard's claim concerning counsel and 
sentencing, we cannot put him in a better position 
than he is already in because DeBoard had an 
opportunity to be represented by counsel at the June 
19th sentencing hearing. 
Utah courts have invoked an exception to mootness 
for an issue that "although technically moot as to a 
particular litigant at the time of appeal, is of wide 
concern, affects the public interest, is likely to recur 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Ong. U.S. Govt. Works 
ht tD: / /or int .west law.com/del^ snnn?4?S7^ 1 \i\inc\M 
ADDENDUM C 
2nd District - Farmington Dept COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TOMMY LEE ANGELOS, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
CONTINUANCE 
NOTICE 
Case No: 991701115 FS 
Judge: JON M. MEMMOTT 
Date: November 13, 2001 
PRESENT 
Clerk: hilarym 
Prosecutor: EDWARDS, MICHAEL S. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CELLA, GLEN T 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: September 13, 1969 
Video 
CHARGES 
1. FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING PRESCRIPTIN - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/12/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
2. FALSELY OBTAINING/DISPENSING PRESCRIPTIN - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 09/12/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
CONTINUANCE 
The Court has made a motion for continuance of Law & Motion. 
The motion is granted. 
Defendant is placed on probation. He will be transferred to the 
Work Center to get signed up with AP&P, find employment and 
residence. 
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Case No: 991701115 
Date: Nov 13, 2001 
PROBATION CONDITIONS: 
002 CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law. 
003 ALCOHOL: Do not use or possess alcoholic beverages or 
frequent places where alcohol is the chief item for sale. 
004 DRUGS: Do not use or possess controlled substance or be in 
the presence of those who use, possess or distribute controlled 
substances. 
005 TESTING: Submit to body fluids testing for evidence of drug 
or alcohol use. 
007 PROGRAM/TREATMENT,: Enter, participate in and complete any 
program, counseling or treatment as directed by AP&P. 
008 SEARCH CONSENT: Submit to search of person, premises or 
vehicle and seizure of any evidence without a search warrant at the 
request of police or probation officer, if they have reasonable 
cause. 
010 EDUCATION/VOCATION: Participate in and complete any 
educational or vocational training as directed by AP&P. 
011 EMPLOYMENT: Obtain and maintain lawful, verifiable, full time 
employment. 
Notify AP&P of any and all prescription medications and get prior 
approval from agent. 
WORK CENTER REVIEW is scheduled. 
Date: 11/20/2001 
Time: 10:45 a.m. 
Location: Courtroom 7 
Justice Complex 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Before Judge: JON M. MEMMOTT 
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ADDENDUM D 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff; 
v 
TOMMY LEE ANGELOS, 
Defendant. 
Appellate Court Case No. '20010509-CA 
District Court Case No. 991701115 FS 
HEARING MAY 8, 2001 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT 
FJJ EH 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR ^ d X*y'p»9la 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER ,, , . . . . . . 
1775 East Ellen Way J~w -
Sandy, Utah84092 ? ^ : = r , „ , ? 
801-523-1186 C^c-'tho c^rt 
Jtot/oZotCA 
1 i FARMINGTON, UTAH - MAY 8 , 2 0 0 1 
2 J HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT PRESIDING 
3 j P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 I THE COURT: Tommy Angelos. Well, I can't believe all 
5 j the things you have done in the last few weeks. To be honest 
6 I'm really extremely disappointed. I mean the record shows that 
7 J you were drinking. You were fired from your job. They 
8 indicated, they reported to me that when they went to the room 
9 you were in they had mini-bottles that were stolen, that they 
10 I believe were stolen from work that were in your room. You were 
11 required to live at home; you left home. You failed to appear 
12 for court. You failed to appear for treatment. You failed to 
13 appear for drug testing. You've had, it looks like you've just 
14 quit doing everything for about three weeks. 
15 THE DEFENDANT: Actually about a week and a half. I 
16 relapsed and for about five days I went on a binge. I went up 
17 to the LDS Hospital to check in Day Spring. They had no beds 
18 there. From there they took me down to Highland Ridge, found 
19 I me a bed. I called Kevin Howard the following morning. He told 
20 me to stay there and he would try to get a hold of you and we 
21 would try to set up a meeting with you. 
22 THE COURT: Well, we're probably a little beyond 
23 meetings. I mean you have been to a number of treatment 
24 programs and, you know, you had a sponsor to help you. You had 
25 your parents to help you. You had the treatment people. You 
I 1 
had a lot of people and, to be honest, you turned your back on 
all of them, just walked away from it. It wasn't just one 
i 
person, you had a whole bunch of people helping you and you 
decided on your own to just turn your back and you knew that 
your parents were concerned. Your parents told you otherwise, j 
l i 
that you were getting into problems. Your sponsor told you you j 
i 
i 
were going to get into problems doing the things you're doing 
and you did it anyway. This isn't a situation where you just J 
sort of fell off the wagon and just relapsed. I mean that's a ; 
real convenient way, you know, and one of your big difficulties I 
i 
is that sometimes you just - you've been through a program. !
 t 
You've been through RSEP. I mean -
THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to go through any more | 
i 
programs. < 
THE COURT: Well, no, and you probably won't. You'll I 
probably just sit in jail or prison. 
THE DEFENDANT: Me and my parents have really never j 
ever discussed my disease. They think that when I leave jail 
I'm cured and that's what they believe. 
THE COURT: Well, do you admit to those violations 
that I talked about? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: What I'm going to do is I'm going to 
continue this one week for sentencing. I don't think you're 
going to be able to continue in Drug Court and probably the 
decision to be made now is whether they're going to recommend 
prison or whether they're going to recommend jail, how much 
jail time, because I think we're out of program options. 
THE DEFENDANT: Now, when I was sentenced to RSEP I 
was sentenced to a year; is that correct? 
THE COURT: Well, yes, but that can be revoked because 
of the violations and so you could do, you could be sentenced 
to prison at this point. I'm going to wait, I'm going to get 
the recommendations from AP&P and I'm going to get the 
recommendations and see what they recommend and evaluate that. 
So I will see you next week. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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